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Introduction 
The fact that managers pursue corporate growth and diversification as a primary objective, and 
that this objective might be contrary to other corporate goals, is well established. For example, 
Adams and Brock in The Bigness Complex note that “America’s corporate giants have not 
performed well over the last fifteen years…Bigness has not delivered the goods, and thus fact is 
no longer a secret” (1986, p. xi). Recent evidence to support this claim is provided in an 
extensive empirical study by Ramezani, Soenen, and Jung who analyze several thousand firms 
over a period of eleven years from 1990 through 2000. They define corporate growth in terms 
of the growth rate in sales, and shareholder value in terms of both economic value added (EVA) 
and abnormal stock-market returns. (These definitions of corporate growth and shareholder 
value are used throughout this paper.) They conclude that “although the corporate profitability 
measures generally rise with earnings and sales growth, an optimal point exists beyond which 
further growth and sales growth, an optimal point exists beyond which further growth destroys 
shareholder value…” (2002, p. 56). They note that many firms go beyond this optimal point and 
conclude that “corporate managers need to abandon the habit of blindly increasing company 
size” (p. 65).  
In this paper I argue that managers’ pursuit of corporate ‘bigness’ may not be as myopic 
as the above studies imply. I provide arguments to the effect that managers simply recognize 
their obligations to all stakeholders: they realize that their obligation to shareholders, albeit 
real, must be balanced with obligations to employees, customers, communities, and society at 
large. These broader obligations may, in many circumstances, be best served through a primary 
focus on overall corporate growth- even when this growth compromises the financial return to 
stockholders. 
 Before I provide ethical justifications for managers’ pursuit of growth, I will begin with a 
brief summary of the several ethically unjustified reasons commonly found in literature. These 
reasons can be roughly grouped into two categories: economically rational reasons, and 
economically irrational reasons.  
Economically Rational Reasons 
The economically rational reasons for pursuing corporate growth can be further subdivided into 
those relating to wealth maximization and those relating to risk reduction. 
Wealth Maximization 
By pursuing corporate growth, managers might be pursuing their own personal material wealth 
at the expense of the shareholders. This is the classic agency problem of financial contracting 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Because managers are not full residual claimants in a public 
corporation, they essentially hold a call option on the underlying assets of the firm. This 
asymmetric incentive structure might induce managers to take actions that are not in the nest 
interests of shareholders. For example, manager’ total remuneration is often correlated with 
the absolute size of their firm (Hill and Jones, 1992). As Greider observes, “*t+he bigger the 
organization, the bigger the surplus is likely to be…; the larger the organization the greater the 
multiple of earning of top officials over the lowest rank” (2003, p. 220). Given this agency-cost 
scenario, therefore, managers grow their companies because by doing so they expect to grow 
their own remuneration, regardless of the effects of such growth on shareholder value. 
Risk Reduction 
To the extent that managers are risk averse, growth through corporate diversification may have 
particular value to them. Managers typically hold large, nondiversified wealth positions in the 
firms they manage: their salary, executive stock options, and direct stock holdings are all 
dependent upon the performance and survival of this one firm. Formally, managers are not 
fully diversified; they are exposed to significant idiosyncratic risk (Jin, 2002). 
 Sine they cannot fully diversify exogenously to their own firm, managers may attempt to 
diversify endogenously through corporate growth. Managers may use the corporate assets 
under their control to buy other firms, to form conglomerates, and thereby diversify their own 
wealth position. For example, May (1995) finds that CEOs with more wealth tied up in their own 
firms’ equity engage in acquisitions that are more diversifying. Large corporate conglomerates 
are formed, therefore, not to maximize shareholders’ wealth, but rather to decrease the risk 
exposure of senior managers. 
Economically Irrational Reasons 
There is significant evidence that  managers pursue corporate growth at the expense of 
stockholder value for reasons other than personal wealth or risk reduction, in other words for 
reasons beyond the rubric of conventional economic rationality. For example, Hill and Jones 
observe that “stock-holders are wealth maximizers, while managers maximize a utility function 
that includes remuneration, power, job security, and status as its central elements” (p. 137). 
They go on to observe that “satisfying the[se] claims of management requires increasing the 
size of the firm…Increasing the concentration of management power requires strategies that 
increase the amount of resources under management control (pp. 137 and 147 respectively). 
Thus Hill and Jones invoke a broader and more nuanced managerial utility function than that 
generally entertained by financial economists: risk-averse wealth maximization a la 
conventional agency theory is too simplistic; managers’ motivations are more complex and 
multifaceted.  
 Formally, these motivations for corporate growth come under the nomenclature of 
behavioral psychology and can be grouped into four basic categories: overconfidence, framing, 
confirmation bias, and regret aversion.  
Overconfidence 
Probably the most familiar behavioral glitch that managers succumb to is a tendency to be 
overconfident about the likely outcome of their decisions. Evidence of an overconfidence bias is 
extensively in the psychology literature (Shefrin, 1999), and even has a pedigree in financial 
economics dating back to Roll’s “Hubris Hypothesis” (1986). Roll explains shareholder-value- 
destroying corporate acquisitions in terms of managerial overconfidence: in corporate 
acquisition decisions, managers simply overestimate the probability of success and 
underestimate the probability of failure. 
 More recently, Shefrin describes the dramatic rise and fall of Palm Inc.- maker of 
handheld computers- as a classic example of managerial overconfidence: 
 Palm’s managers turned out to be overconfident that past growth rates 
for its main product would continue. In an attempt to revive disappointing 
demand, they accelerated the next version of their device. In doing so, they 
committed the same over-confidence-induced error that Sony made years 
earlier with the Chromatron. (p. 13) 
 Thus managers, such as those at Palm Inc., may genuinely believe that their pursuit of 
corporate growth is consistent with shareholder value. However, they are blinded tot eh value 
destroying results of their actions by their economically irrational overconfidence.  
Framing 
The psychological concept of framing concerns the way in which the human brain processes 
information. In order not to be swamped by the massive amounts of information it receives, 
the brain forms mental accounts with which is ‘frames’ the amount of information considered 
relevant to any given decision. Information not contained within this decision frame is ignored, 
even though from a broader perspective it might appear critically relevant. This is similar to the 
concept of bounded rationality in economics: “individuals simply cannot conceive of all the 
possible eventualities that may occur…” (Hart, 1983, p. 23). 
 In current context, framing becomes problematic when managers do not frame their 
decision-making around shareholder value. For example, Jensen argues that the power of 
market analysts leads managers to frame their decisions too narrowly. Managers focus entirely 
on meeting analysts’ earning forecasts: 
 Over the last decade companies have struggled more and more 
desperately to meet analysts’ expectations. Caught up by a buoyant economy 
and the pace of value creation set by the market’s best performers, analysts 
challenged the companies they covered to reach for unprecedented earnings 
growth. Executives often acquiesced to increasingly unrealistic projections and 
adopted them as a basis for setting goals for their organizations. (2002, p. 42). 
 Thus the power of market analysts is inducing managers to adopt the wrong frame of 
reference: short-term earnings rather than long-term earnings rather than long-term value. 
Shefrin recounts a specific example of this supplied by Elizabeth Nickel, CFO of Herman-Miller 
Inc.: 
 Nickel described another occasion when Herman-Miller was analyzing an 
online initiative that would have created value. However, her team was reluctant 
to go ahead because of the negative impact the initiative would have had on 
short-term earnings per share… In other words, the financial managers at 
Herman-Miller made their decision based on framing- on how the financial 
implications of the decision were packaged. (2003, p. 11) 
 In current context, the implication of framing is that managers tend to frame their 
decisions in terms of sales and earnings growth, perhaps to meet analysts’ expectations, rather 
than in terms of shareholder value creation. Thus it is not that managers consciously choose 
not to serve the interests of shareholders, but rather that such a choice simply does not enter 
into their decision-making frame.  
Confirmation Bias 
This is a psychological bias captured succinctly by the expression, ‘shoot the messenger.’ None 
of us like to hear bad news, or more specifically information that fails to confirm our preferred 
view of reality. Thus, in decision-making, we tend to give more weight to information that 
confirms our pre-existing worldview, while dismissing information that does not confirm it. 
 As a psychological phenomenon, confirmation bias is similar to framing. The essential 
difference is that framing defines the parameters of the information’s set that we deem 
relevant, whereas confirmation bias concerns the relative weight we give to information 
received within that frame. 
 In the context of a manager’s pursuit of corporate growth, Aggarwal and Samwick 
(2003) explain how Jill Barad, CEO and chairman of Mattel, suffered from confirmation bias in 
making her decision to acquire The Learning Company, Glenn Bozath, senior vice president of 
corporate communications at Mattel, made it clear that Mattel was framing this acquisitions 
decision strictly in terms of corporate sales growth: “at Mattel we knew we wanted to build this 
to be a large business and we never could have build it so quickly without this merger” (p. 77). 
In a similar statement, Barad confirmed this frame: “It made great sense for us to seek out a 
partner to help us realize out $1 billion *sales+ goal” (p. 77). 
 Concern over the wisdom of the acquisition was expressed both by Mattel insiders and 
by outside analysts. This concern generally centered on the fact that The Learning Company 
was an educational software company, not a toy company. Mattel had no experience in the 
software industry or indeed in any industry other than toys. However, Barad summarily 
dismissed these concerns and focused entirely on the perceived benefits of the merger: she 
focused on the information that confirmed her beliefs concerning the wisdom of the 
acquisition, observing “*t+his merger will provide Mattel with tremendous opportunities for 
synergies, cross branding, age expansion, consumer relevancy and channel expansion” (p. 77). 
 Mattel went ahead in 2000 and purchased The Learning Company for $3.5 billion. 
Almost immediately the merger began to unravel as The Learning Company amassed huge 
losses. Within a year Mattel divested itself of its acquisition, selling The Learning Company to a 
third party for no cash up front. Shortly thereafter, Mattlel’s board of directors fired Barad. The 
board admitted that it had placed too much trust in Barad’s judgment. 
 In the current context, the board of Mattel had acquiesced to Barad’s confirmation bias 
by failing to pressure her into taking a more balanced view of the acquisition. Not only did the 
board fail to question Barad’s apparent pursuit of sales growth in preference to shareholder 
value, but they also failed to question whether the acquisition of The Learning Company would 
further either objective over the long term.  
 
Regret Aversion 
 
Continuing with the example of Mattei, why did the board wait so long before it acted? By the 
time Barad was finally fired by the board, MatteI's stock price had declined by some sixty 
percent from its value two years prior to The Learning Company acquisition. One likely reason is 
that the members of Mattei's board were reluctant to admit, both to themselves and to 
stockholders, that backing Barad's decision was a mistake. For example, Staw and Ross note 
that a certain personal and social esteem accrues to those individuals who "stick to their guns" 
in the face of adversity (1987, p. 59). Thus managers may pursue a psychic payoff ff, in the form 
of maintained status and reputation, by continuing an unprofitable project in the hope, rather 
than any realistic expectation, that the project will become profitable in the future. This could 
lead to a 'ratcheting effect' whereby projects and acquisitions are initiated far more readily 
than they are later abandoned, even though abandonment--to the unbiased eye-is clearly the 
value maximizing decision. So corporate growth continues and the total size of the firm ratchets 
up as the firm becomes burdened with loss-mak.ing 'pet' projects (Dobson and Dorsey, 1992). 
 Under the regret aversion scenario, therefore, levels of corporate growth beyond those 
that maximize shareholder value are the result of managers' unwillingness to admit defeat by 
reversing prior decisions. Managers may know full well that these prior decisions now have a 
negative value, and so should be abandoned immediately. However, managers will continue 
the projects rather than pay the psychic cost resulting from the projects' abandonment. 
 
Method or Madness  
 
Our discussion so far has clearly not been very flattering to managers. We have depicted them 
in their headlong pursuit of corporate growth either as charlatans, or as idiots, redistributing 
wealth from shareholders to themselves, or succumbing to some psychological pathology. 
Viewed from either an economic or a moral perspective none of the reasons proffered 
so far to explain managers' pursuit of corporate growth appear normatively justifiable. 
Managers have a fiduciary duty to stockholders, not to mention contractual obligations to 
bondholders and other stakeholders, and none of the behavioral motivations attached to 
managers so far in this paper could be construed as meeting these duties and obligations.  
The remainder of this paper, however, identifies two other reasons to explain managers' 
pursuit of corporate growth. These reasons are normatively justified, from both the 
perspectives of economics and of ethics. 
The Problem with Stockholder Value 
What should managers be trying to achieve? This seems a simple question, and finance 
textbooks will typically supply a simple answer: "Throughout this book we operate on the 
assumption that management's primary goal is stockholder wealth maximization, which 
translates into maximizing the price of the firm's common stock" (Brigham and Houston, 2004, 
p. 15; emphasis in original). Some business practitioners, namely Warren Buffett, hold a 
different view: "We do not want to maximize the price at which Berkshire shares trade. We 
wish instead for them to trade in a narrow range centered at intrinsic business value" (200], p. 
4]). 
 Michael Jensen attempts a reconciliation with his suggestion that managers should be 
"[m]aximizing the total market value of the firm-that is the sum of the market values of the 
equity, debt and any other contingent claims outstanding on the firm ...." (2000, p. 42). So, 
given Jensen's answer to our original question, we can conclude the following. If managers are 
pursuing corporate growth in sales or earnings at the expense of the market value of the firm, 
then they are acting wrongly-where 'wrongly' is defined as acting in a way that is inconsistent 
with the accepted definition of what they should be trying to achieve. 
 But, returning to the original question, is maximizing the total market value of the firm 
or maximizing shareholder value really what managers should be striving to achieve? Consider 
the following statement from Buchholz and Rosenthal's business ethics textbook: "There is no 
justification for shareholders holding such an important position ... and having first priority as 
regards corporate activity.... The idea that shareholders are the group that takes the greatest 
risk and thus deserves special treatment is a fiction" (] 998, p. 169). Or consider the following 
statements by other business ethicists: the "primary obligation ... [of business] is to provide 
meaningful work for ... employees" (Bowie, ]99]); "if in some instance it turns out that what is 
ethical leads to a company's demise ... so be it" (De-George, ]990); "[p]rovision to meet need is 
the highest purpose of business; provision to satisfy unreasonable and socially harmful desire, 
... perverts the purpose of business" (Byron, ]988). 
 This conceptually broader and more nuanced answer to our original what-should-
managers-be-trying-to-achieve question is often referred to as 'stakeholder" theory: 
Stakeholder Theory is distinct because it addresses morals and values explicitly 
as a central feature of managing organizations. . . . [F]or stakeholder theory, 
attention to the interests and wellbeing of some non-shareholders is obligatory 
for more than the prudential and instrumental purposes of wealth maximization 
of equity shareholders. [Phillips, Freeman, and Wicks, 2003, p. 481]. 
 
A stakeholder-type answer to our what-should-managers-be-trying-to achieve question is 
increasingly reflected in corporate credos and mission statements. As Chang points in his recent 
survey of Alternative views on corporate objectives, "actual corporate credos and mission 
statements practically never give priority to the interests of stockholders" (1998, p. 5). These 
mission statements invariably place emphasis on some broader obligation of the firm to groups 
other than stockholders: employees, the environment, society at large. 
 Given that a corporation's mission statement represents its formal proclamation of 
ultimate objective, should not the content of this statement provide the answer to our original 
question') What managers should be trying to achieve is the stated mission of the corporation. 
For example, Johnson & Johnson Inc. begins its mission statement: "We believe our first 
responsibility is to the doctors, nurses and patients, to mothers and fathers and all others who 
use our products and services." Only toward the end of the statement are shareholders 
mentioned as deserving a "L1ir return." For a manager at Johnson & Johnson, therefore, should 
this not be the manager's objective? If the manager believes that pursuing corporate growth, 
even at the expense of shareholder value, will best achieve this mission, then is not the 
manager fully justified in pursuing growth? Formally, the pursuit of corporate growth at the 
expense of shareholder value might be justified in terms of either deontological or utilitarian 
theories. 
 
Deontological Justification 
 
A deontological moral defense is one based, at least in part, on consideration of factors other 
than the consequences of the act under consideration. In the context of managerial objectives, 
the following is a deontologically justifiable principle: 
Managers should be guided by the stated mission of their corporation; they should choose 
whichever action is most consistent  
with this stated mission. 
So if a manager believes that pursuing corporate growth in preference to shareholder value in 
some situation is more consistent with the firm's mission statement, then this manager is prima 
facie justified in pursuing corporate growth. But how likely is this? Specifically, under what 
circumstances would the pursuit of corporate growth better serve a firm's stated mission than 
would the pursuit of shareholder value? For which stakeholders does the firm's mission 
statement emphasize corporate size? 
 One likely candidate is employees. Consider Norman Bowie's earlier definition of a 
corporation's objective in terms of the provision of meaningful work for employees. Presumably 
any work is better than no work, and growing firms are more likely to be employment 
providers. Also, a large diversified firm will] provide greater variety of assignments within the 
organization, and greater chance of advancement. Large corporations also tend to offer 
employees more extensive retirement and health benefits. 
 Employees, and other stakeholders, may also benefit from superior corporate 
governance in larger companies. Second, boards of directors of larger firms are likely to better 
represent employee diversity: "women and minorities have less presence on smaller firms' 
boards of directors" (Daily and Dalton, 2003, p. 426). 
 A focus on growth in preference to shareholder value may also create a more stable 
environment for a] I stakeholders. Greider makes this point: 
 The disciplinary doctrine of "shareholder value" deliberately induces 
financial insecurity on the company-the opposite of the secure financial 
commitments a company needs to think beyond its immediate horizon. The 
recurring managerial initiatives to "downsize" and "rationalize" may deliver 
short-term financial gain, but they can also hollow out the company's dynamic 
integration of its many working parts. [2003, p. 232] 
A similar point was made in a 2003 Financial Times special report on the US 
biotechnology industry: 
The US biotechnology market is dividing into two distinct groups- atop 
tier of big companies ... and the rest of the industry, comprising hundreds of 
smaller companies. The success of the top tier companies reflects several 
developments. First, they are generally very liquid stocks, second, they have 
grown to a stage at which they have sustainable business models and a pipeline 
of successful products and, third, they have the financial muscle and resources to 
"buy in" promising new drugs as well as developing them in house.... While the 
big companies halve done very well this year, the outlook for the smaller ones 
remains grim as they scrabble for cash. [2003, p. 4] 
In the biotechnology industry, therefore, the absolute size of the company may provide 
specific benefits in terms of profitability and long-term sustainability. A manager of a smaller 
biotech company who pursues long term growth in preference to some other measure of 
shareholder value could clearly be construed as acting entirely in the interests of the 10ng-tenl1 
health of the company. If the mission of the company is to serve the interests of all significant 
stakeholders, a 10 Johnson & Johnson, then the pursuit of growth, even at the expense of 
short-term shareholder value, could well be the best way to achieve this mission. In short, 
corporate growth achieves market power and stability, which is likely to serve all stakeholders 
and the corporate mission over the long term. 
 
Utilitarian Justification  
Managers' pursuit of corporate growth could be defiladed on utilitarian grounds if it 
could be shown to improve aggregate social welfare. This improved welfare could be defined in 
simple economic terms, such as higher GNP per capita, or it could be defined in terms of its 
contribution to what society perceives as its "common good," where the common good is 
defined as the "overlapping consensus of reasonable citizens in a pluralist society" (Riordan, 
1996, p. 4). Thus if "reasonable citizens" in aggregate place intrinsic value solely on large 
companies, independent of the contributions the company might make to shareholder value, 
then on utilitarian common-good grounds a manager's pursuit of growth would be justified. 
Indeed, one could even argue that such a pursuit would be mandated because for the 
corporation to even exist requires societal consent that the interests of the corporation and 
society converge. But does contemporary US society equate the common good with corporate 
size, independent of contributions to shareholder value? 
One individual manager who has attracted broad attention in recent months is Dennis 
Kozlowski, former chief executive of Tyco corporation. Kozlowski was accused of defrauding 
Tyco of some $600 million via unapproved bonuses, compensation, and share deals. Kozlowski's 
one primary pillar of defense is the rapid rate of growth that Tyco Inc. achieved under 
Kozlowski's stewardship (Bowe, 2003, p. 20). Of course, even if such a defense were generally 
recognized, it would in no way in and of itself justify Koslowski's alleged defrauding of Tyco. 
One reason why society may place value on large companies is that they tend to be 
associated with large economies in aggregate: the US is the largest economy in the world and 
its corporations dominate any ranking of the world's largest. A society may place particular 
value on a large economy, regardless of per capita wealth levels, because it is associated with 
military security. As Kay observes, "[o]nly in military spending does the size of the economy 
really matter" (2003, p. IS). He notes that society tends 10 view economic size, independent of 
wealth, as something intrinsically worth striving for: "international economic competition [is] 
another spotting World Cup ... in which countries vie with each other to be 'Top Nation'" (p. I5). 
Note also the attention given to company size rankings: whether it be the Fortune 500 or the 
Financial Times Global 1000, to society as a whole size does matter. 
In the US corporate sector, as perhaps elsewhere in US society, big really is regarded as 
beautiful. An inherent worth is attached to big companies. Thus big companies, in and of 
themselves, and specifically as a function of their size, serve what society perceives as its 
common good. Managers who pursue corporate growth as an ultimate objective, therefore, are 
fulfilling their social mission: these managers are pursuing the common good as defined by 
social consensus. On utilitarian grounds, even if it is at the expense of shareholder value, a 
manager's pursuit of growth is justified. 
 
Conclusion  
Empirical evidence exists that managers pursue corporate growth, even at the expense of 
shareholder value. Conventional explanations for this tend to focus on either agency theory or 
behavioral psychology: managers are either pursuing their own personal wealth at the expense 
of stockholders, or they are succumbing to some behavioral bias that leads them to 
inadvertently pursue corporate growth.  
In this paper I suggest an alternative explanation. Managers consciously pursue 
corporate growth, even at the expense of shareholder value, for one or both of two morally 
justified reasons. First, they believe that the pursuit of growth is most consistent with the 
corporation's stated mission, and so this pursuit best serves all corporate stakeholders. Second, 
they recognize that their firm is a publicly sanctioned institution and that the pursuit of growth 
best serves the interests of society at large and as such society's conception of its common 
good.  
As discussed in the Introduction, in titling their book The Bigness Complex, Adams and 
Brock implied that bigness was a 'complex' in the sense of a managerial pathology. The 
arguments I provide here, however, indicate that bigness is more accurately viewed as 
'complex' in the sense that managers pursue it in order to satisfy a complex mix of 
deontological and teleological moral obligations. 
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